Mumbai,+India-Terrorism

Mumbai has suffered several terrorist attacks, mostly bombings, including: •  12 March 1993 - Series of 13 bombs go off killing 257 •  06 December 2002 - Bomb goes off in a bus in Ghatkopar killing 2 •  27 January 2003 - Bomb goes off on a bicycle in Vile Parle killing 1 •  14 March 2003 - Bomb goes off in a train in Mulund killing 10 •  28 July 2003 - Bomb goes off in a bus in Ghatkopar killing 4 •  25 August 2003 - Two Bombs go off in cars near the Gateway of India and Zaveri //Bazaar// killing 50   •   11 July 2006 - Series of seven bombs go off in trains killing 209 •  26 November 2008  to 29 November 2008 - Coordinated series of attacks killing at least 172 Most recent attack- Nov. 2008: •  At least 188 people, including 31 foreign nationals, were killed and at least 293 were injured in the attacks; Nov 26-29. •  Initially, a previously unknown organization called the Deccan Mujahideen claimed responsibility. Later, Azam Amir Kasav, the single terrorist who was captured alive, disclose However, no official attribution of responsibility has been made by the Indian Government. •  Experts have conflicting views as to whether Al Qaeda played a role in the attacks •  On 4 December 2008, NDTV reports India having proof that Pakistan 's intelligence agency ISI was behind the deadly Mumbai attacks. It also reports, "the US has told Pakistan that they have proof of terrorist outfit Lashkar-e-Taiba's role and sought the arrest of its chief Hafeez Sayeed." •  Nov 29th: Indian security forces, in Operation Black Tornado, regained control of all attack sites •  External affairs minister in India admits the possibility of striking terrorist camps in Pakistan •  The United States, Austrailia , Britain , Israel , and Malaysian authorities have sent FBI or other federal officials to support India and probe into the attacks •  Bad Guys= Lashkar-e-Taiba: founded by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed in the Kunar province of Afghanistan, and is currently based near Lahore , Pakistan operating several militant training camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Lashkar-e-Taiba members have carried out major attacks against India and its primary objective is to end Indian rule in Kashmir. Some breakaway Lashkar members have also been accused of carrying out attacks in Pakistan , particularly in Karachi, to mark its opposition to the policies of President Pervez Musharraf. The organization is banned as a terrorist organization by India, Pakistan , the United States , the United Kingdom, the European Union, Russia and Australia. PEOPLE in India are describing last week's terrorist attack on Mumbai as India 's September 11th. In many ways, the comparison is apt. Although the death toll, at about 190, is a fraction of the number killed in America, this brutal attack on a business capital has traumatised an entire country. But if the attack on Mumbai is like September 11th, India needs to learn from America 's mistakes. The 19 al-Qaeda hijackers changed history seven years ago. Had they not felled the twin towers, America would not have invaded Afghanistan or Iraq. The easiest way for India to play into the hands of those who sent the ten terrorists to Mumbai would be for India to consider a military response against Pakistan. It is probable that the terrorists did embark from Pakistan. The testimony of the surviving attacker, the fact that the band arrived by sea, and American intelligence all point that way. A prime suspect is Lashkar-e-Taiba, one of several groups based in Pakistan that are officially banned but suspected of receiving quiet encouragement from parts of the Pakistani state to //wage jihad// in the disputed territory of Kashmir and, increasingly, in Afghanistan as well. When terrorists attacked the seat of India 's Parliament in December 2001, the two countries mobilised their armies and came close to war. This time India has shown admirable forbearance. There has been remonstrance but no sabre-rattling. But forbearance alone cannot be a long-term answer to the problem of Pakistan. The Mumbai plot is only the latest indication that this huge, nuclear-armed country is not under the full control of its newly elected government. When President Asif Ali Zardari said after the carnage in Mumbai that he would take the strictest action against any guilty individual or group "in my part of the country", it was perhaps a slip of the tongue. But the implication is true: large tracts of Pakistan, notably the tribal areas abutting Afghanistan , are under the control of local tribesmen, the Taliban, al-Qaeda or a mixture of all three. The fighting in the tribal areas and the killing last year of Benazir Bhutto misleads outsiders into calling Pakistan a failed state. If that were truly so, America's policy of bombing al-Qaeda targets inside Pakistan might make some sense—as might Indian military intervention in Pakistan. But it is not that simple. Most of Pakistan is quite firmly under the state's control. However, just as the state does not control all the country, nor does Mr Zardari control all the state. The ultimate arbiters of foreign and security policy in Pakistan have long been the army and intelligence services. The army's top brass seem in tune with their president in seeing Islamist terrorists as the most dangerous enemy facing Pakistan. But for some soldiers and spooks, the manipulation of the jihadists on Pakistan 's soil remains a rational instrument of foreign policy. Although it is America 's ally, Pakistan maintains links with the predominantly ethnic-Pushrun Taliban in Afghanistan, as a hedge against the day America leaves and a way to thwart a perceived Indian plan of strategic encirclement. The insurgency in Kashmir, likewise, is seen as a means of bogging down the old enemy, India. For those in Pakistan who think this way, the warming of relations between America and India—especially the rewriting of global proliferation rules to forgive India for building a bomb—looks like a menacing change that needs to be countered. To understand these motives is not to condone them. India has every right to demand that Pakistan stops letting its territory be used as a terrorist haven and to track down those responsible. But these demands have to be accompanied by a balanced strategy that bolsters Mr Zardari and weakens the argument of his generals, not (as in the case of those American bombing raids) the other way round. It should include inducements, such as Indian flexibility over Kashmir, as well as pressure. Pakistan 's army would presumably like nothing better than an excuse to give up its demoralising battle against fellow Muslims in the tribal areas and redeploy against the traditional Hindu enemy in the east. India must not fall into that trap.
 * Mumbai ****, **** India- **** Terrorism **
 * After Mumbai **Dec 4th 2008 From //The Economist// print edition
 * Even though the terrorists probably came from **** Pakistan ****, **** India **** should continue to **** keep its cool **
 * The vengeance trap **